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Efficient Network Sharing with Asymmetric
Constraint Information
Meng Zhang and Jianwei Huang
Abstract—Network sharing has become a key feature of
various enablers of the next generation network, such as net-
work function virtualization and fog computing architectures.
Network utility maximization (NUM) is a general framework for
achieving fair, efficient, and cost-effective sharing of constrained
network resources. When agents have asymmetric and private
information, however, a fundamental economic challenge is how
to solve the NUM Problem considering the self-interests of
strategic agents. Many previous related works have proposed
economic mechanisms that can cope with agents’ private utilities.
However, the network sharing paradigm introduces the issue
of information asymmetries regarding constraints. The related
literature largely neglected such an issue; limited closely related
studies provided solutions only applicable to specific application
scenarios. To tackle these issues, we propose the Decomposable
NUM (DeNUM) Mechanism and the Dynamic DeNUM (DyDe-
NUM) Mechanism, the first mechanisms in the literature for
solving NUM Problems considering private utility and constraint
information. The key idea of both mechanisms is to decentralize
the decision process to agents, who will make resource allocation
decisions without the need of revealing private information to
others. Under a monitorable influence assumption, the DeNUM
Mechanism yields the network-utility maximizing solution at an
equilibrium, and achieves other desirable economic properties
(such as individual rationality and budget balance). We further
establish the connection between the equilibrium structure and
the primal-dual solution to a related optimization problem, based
on which we prove the convergence of the DeNUM Algorithm to
an equilibrium. When the agents’ influences are not monitorable,
we propose the DyDeNUM Mechanism that yields the network-
utility maximizing solution at the cost of the balanced budget.
Finally, as a case study, we apply the proposed mechanisms to
solving the NUM problem for a fog-based user-provided network,
and show that both mechanisms improve the network utility by
34% compared to a non-cooperation benchmark.
Index Terms—Mechanism design, network sharing, network
utility maximization, asymmetric constraint information.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivations
The proliferation of mobile devices and applications has
been significantly increasing the demand for wireless services.
According to Cisco, global mobile traffic has been predicted
to increase with an annual growth rate of 60% in the next
This work is supported by the General Research Fund CUHK 14219016
from Hong Kong UGC, the Presidential Fund from the Chinese University of
Hong Kong, Shenzhen, and the Shenzhen Institute of Artificial Intelligence
and Robotics for Society (AIRS). This paper was presented in part at the IEEE
INFOCOM, Paris, France, May 2019 [1]. (Corresponding author: Jianwei
Huang.)
M. Zhang and J. Huang are with Department of Information Engineering,
The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, NT, Hong Kong, China.
J. Huang is also with School of Engineering and Science, The Chinese
University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen, China, and the Shenzhen Institute of
Artificial Intelligence and Robotics for Society (AIRS). E-mail: {zm015,
jwhuang}@ie.cuhk.edu.hk.
several years, reaching 48 exabytes per month in 2021 [2].
The unprecedented traffic demand has been pushing mobile
network operators to explore more cost-effective and efficient
approaches to provide mobile services. Network sharing is
a promising paradigm to reduce capital expenditure and the
operational expenditure and achieve efficient network sources
utilization. It has emerged as an indispensable feature in the
5G system and its enabling architectures including network
slicing [3], network function virtualization [4], and fog-based
networking [5].
To achieve efficient network sharing, network utility maxi-
mization (NUM) is a promising general framework for sharing
multiple divisible resources (i.e., those that can be infinitely
divided, e.g., bandwidth, power, storages, and network slices)
among multiple agents (such as tenants in network slicing ar-
chitecture and fog nodes in the fog networking architecture) in
many network resource allocation problems [6], [7]. Typically,
a NUM Problem aims to optimize allocative/sharing decisions
to maximize the aggregate agents’ utility, subject to some
(coupling) system-level and (uncoupling) local constraints. It
had found numerous applications across many different areas
besides the network sharing applications.1
In practice, a system designer (such as a 5G network slice
broker [3] in the network slicing architecture) of a networked
system does not have complete network information to solve
the NUM directly. Even if agents are willing to share their
information, gathering such information by a centralized deci-
sion maker can incur significant communication overhands and
solving such a problem can lead to significant computational
overhead, when the size of the NUM Problem is large.
Fortunately, many NUM Problems exhibit the decomposability
structure (to be explained in details in Section IV-A), which
makes it possible to decompose the original centralized NUM
Problem into several subproblems [6]. With such a structure,
one can design a distributed optimization algorithm through
distributively solving subproblems coordinated by proper sig-
naling (often coinciding with the dual variables [6]). Therefore,
such a distributed optimization approach can significantly
relieve the system designer’s burdens of computation and
communications.
The distributed optimization approach assumes that agents
are obedient, i.e., willing to follow the algorithm. However, in
practice, an agent can be strategic and self-interested (having
her own local objective that is different from the system
level objective). Thus, an agent may attempt to misreport
information or tamper with the algorithms to her advantage,
which may result in severe allocation inefficiency. One way
1Examples include wireless sensor networks [8], mobile networks [9], [10],
power grids [11], and cloud computing networks [12].
2for the system designer to address this issue is to design a
proper economic mechanism by anticipating such strategic
behaviors. For the networked divisible resource allocation
problems, related research efforts have mainly focused on the
Nash mechanisms which achieve the efficient allocations in a
Nash equilibrium (NE) (e.g. [13]–[22]).
Nevertheless, the network sharing paradigm has introduced
several important issues that have been overlooked in the
existing mechanisms in the literature. First, although most
existing mechanisms (e.g. [13]–[22]) can cope with strategic
agents’ private utilities, they assumed that the information
regarding the system and local constraints (such as the network
topology and capacities) are known by the designer of the
mechanism. This is not always true in the network sharing
paradigm, since the system designer often does not own the
network resources by itself and hence has limited informa-
tion about the networks. Each self-interested agent may also
misreport her private information related to constraints to her
advantage. Misreporting constraint information can also incur
severe inefficiency loss, as demonstrated in Section III.
Second, existing mechanisms proposed for network resource
allocation are often applicable to only specific networking
scenarios (e.g. flow control problems [13]–[17], power and
spectrum allocation [18], and electric vehicles systems [19]).
These mechanisms often do not work for more general and
sophisticated NUM Problems or the general network sharing
framework.
The above issues motivate the following key question in this
paper:
Question. How should one design a unified mechanism frame-
work for the NUM problem, considering strategic agents’
private information (of both utilities and constraints)?
B. Solution Approach and Contributions
In this paper, we adopt the idea of optimization decompo-
sition [6] in the mechanism design, building upon which we
first propose a Nash Mechanism for the class of Decomposable
NUM (DeNUM) Problems, and we call it the DeNUM mecha-
nism. Our approach differs from the traditional mechanism de-
sign approach in the following sense. A traditional mechanism
directly determines the allocation and money transfer based
on agents’ submitted messages [30]. In contrast, by exploiting
an indirect optimization decomposition structure, our DeNUM
mechanism decentralizes the allocative decisions to the side
of agents. Specifically, based on agents’ submitted messages,
the DeNUM Mechanism partitions the system constraints into
several individual constraints which are imposed to corre-
sponding agents. Then, the mechanism let agents distributively
determine the allocations. Such decentralization eliminates
the necessity for agents to reveal their utility and constraint
information. Furthermore, such a constraint partitioning works
for any decomposable NUM Problem, and thus constitutes a
general mechanism framework.
The success of a Nash mechanism (such as our proposed
DeNUM Mechanism) relies on a distributed algorithm for
agents to attain an equilibrium. Imposing individual constraints
induces the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) concept,
in which agents have interdependent strategy spaces [41].
Designing a distributed algorithm that converges to a GNE is
notoriously difficult, since some commonly used NE seeking
algorithms fail to converge here [41]. We overcome this
challenge by establishing the connection between the GNE
and the primal-dual solution to a related optimization problem,
which makes it possible to design a family of algorithms that
can converge to the GNE.
Our proposed DeNUM Mechanism assumes that the system
designer or the other agents can monitor the influences of each
agent’s action to the system (such as consuming resources
or generating interference). However, in some applications,
monitoring might be too costly or difficult. This further
motivates us to propose a Dynamic DeNUM (DyDeNUM)
Mechanism. Different from the DeNUM Mechanism, the
DyDeNUM Mechanism exploits a direct optimization decom-
position structure that does not further introduce auxiliary
constraints. This eliminates the necessity of the monitorable
influences. We then show that the DyDeNUM Mechanism can
yield the network utility maximization at an equilibrium even
when the influence functions are not monitorable. However,
such a property comes at a cost of the budget balance.
To summarize, our main contributions are:
• General network sharing mechanism framework: Our
DeNUM framework, including both the DeNUM Mech-
anism and the DyDeNUM Mechanism, together with the
related distributed algorithms, achieves the network utility
maximization for a general class of NUM Problems.
• Private constraint information: To the best of our knowl-
edge, we design the first mechanisms in the literature that
can cope with agents’ information asymmetries regarding
system and local constraints in additional to the asymmet-
ric utility information.
• Distributed algorithm design: For agents to distributively
attach the GNE of the DeNUM Mechanism, we further
propose the DeNUM Algorithm. We prove its conver-
gence by relating the GNE to the primal-dual solution to a
related optimization problem. Such a proof methodology
also suggests a general approach to designing distributed
algorithms.
• Elimination of monitorability requirement: Our DyDe-
NUM Mechanism can achieve the network utility max-
imizing outcome at an equilibrium even if agents’ in-
fluences are not monitorable, at the cost of the budget
balance.
• Fog-based user-provided network: We apply the DeNUM
framework to the fog-based application user-provided
networks, of which existing mechanisms are inapplicable.
We show that both mechanisms can improve the network
utility by 34% compared to a benchmark.
We organize the rest of this paper as follows. We review
the literature in Section II, and motivates our study in Section
III with an example of system inefficiency due to agents’
misreport. We describe the system model and formulate the
decomposable NUM Problems in Section IV. We formally
design the DeNUM Mechanism and the DeNUM Algorithm in
Sections V and VI, respectively. In Section VII, we formally
3TABLE I
MECHANISM DESIGN FOR THE NUM PROBLEMS AND RELATED NETWORK APPLICATIONS
Reference Framework Type Private Constraints
Property
Distributed Algorithm
Full Implementation Budget Balance
Nash Mechanisms
[13]–[15] Flow Control × × × ×
[16] Flow Control × X X ×
[17] Joint Flow Control and Multi-Path Routing × X X X
[18] Power Allocation and Spectrum Sharing × × X ×
[19] Electricity Management for Electric Vehicles × X × ×
[20] Networked Public Goods Only Local Constraints X X ×
[21] Networked Private Goods × X X X
[22] NUM Problems with Linear Constraints × X X ×
DeNUM Decomposable NUM Problems X X X X
Dynamic Mechanisms
[28] Flow Control × × × X
[29] Rate Allocation × × × X
DyDeNUM Decomposable NUM Problems X × × X
design the DyDeNUMMechanism. In Section VIII, we solve a
concrete example of user-provided network using the proposed
DeNUM framework. Section IX concludes the paper.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
A. Mechanism Design for Network Function Virtualization
A group of literature related to our work is the mechanism
design for network function virtualization (e.g. [4], [33]–[37]),
which is an important application of the network sharing
paradigm. Specifically, in [33], Fu and Kozat proposed to
use the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) Mechanism [23]–[25]
to regulate the virtualized wireless resources. In [34], Gu et
al. proposed an efficient auction for service chains in the net-
work function virtualization market. In [35], Zhu and Hossain
studied an interesting hierarchical auction for virtualization of
5G cellular networks. Du et. al. in [36] proposed an auction
traffic offloading based on software-defined network. Zhang et
al. in [37] considered a double auction for the virtual resource
allocation of software-defined networks. Readers can refer to
the survey [4] for other related work.
There are two main differences between our work and this
group of literature. First, most works (e.g. [33]–[36]) modeled
the virtualized resources as indivisible goods and used one-
shot VCG-type mechanisms to achieve the network utility
maximization. Reference [37] is an exception that considered
the divisible virtualized resources but assumed that agents
are price-takers instead of strategic agents. In this paper, we
consider the shared resources divisible, which can achieve
more flexible network sharing among agents. Moreover, a
one-shot VCG-type mechanism is not applicable here. This is
because (i) the one-shot VCG-type mechanism requires agents
to report their entire utility functions, which incurs significant
communication overheads due to the often high dimension
information to fully describe the utility function, and (ii)
it is impossible for a one-shot dominant-strategy allocation
mechanism2 (such as a VCG-type mechanism) to achieve
several properties including the network-utility maximization,
budget balance, and individual rationality at the same time
[26]. For instance, the VCG-type mechanism cannot achieve
2In a dominant-strategy allocation mechanism, it is a dominant strategy for
each agent to truthfully reveal her private information (independent of other
agents’ choices).
the budget balance; Ge and Berry in [27] proposed a dominant-
strategy allocation mechanism by quantizing divisible goods
but does not achieve the maximal network utility. Finally, the
existing literature assumes that the constraint information is
globally known.
B. Mechanism Design for the NUM Problems
1) Nash Mechanisms: Due to the above mentioned rea-
sons, research efforts for divisible network resource allocation
mainly prefer Nash mechanisms to the dominant-strategy
allocation mechanisms (such as the aforementioned one-shot
VCG mechanism).
There are many excellent works that proposed Nash mecha-
nisms for specific allocations, such as the general flow control
problems (e.g. [13]–[17]), plug-in electric vehicles system (e.g.
[19]), power allocation and spectrum sharing problem (e.g.
[18]), networked public good [20], networked private good
[21]. Sinha et al. studied a relatively more general setting
in [22], which is also a subclass of the problem that we
study in this work. Only one work considered the private
constraint information [20], which focused on the uncoupling
local constraints for a specific setting instead of the more
challenging coupling system constraints.
2) Dynamic Mechanisms: The aforementioned works con-
sidered one-shot mechanisms. References [28], [29] studied
interesting dynamic mechanisms that dynamically implement
Grove-like taxation [25], which motivate our DyDeNUM
Mechansim. Different from [28], [29], our DyDeNUM Mech-
anism is able to cope with the asymmetric constraint in-
formation and applicable to a more general class of the
decomposable NUM Problems.
We summarize the key features of the proposed DeNUM
Mechanism and the DyDeNUM Mechanism and the existing
mechanisms for the NUM Problems in Table I.
C. Distributed Algorithms for Nash Mechanisms
Only a few studies focused on the distributed algorithms
(dynamics) for the Nash mechanisms for network applications
[17], [21]. We cannot directly apply these algorithms in [17],
[21] in our context. This is because, for GNEs, the best
response dynamics considered in [21] was proven to converge
only in restrictive cases [41], while [17] requires to solve a
centralized optimization problem in each iteration, which is
not available in the problems considered here.
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III. AN EXAMPLE OF INEFFICIENCY DUE TO MISREPORTS
To show that misreporting private constraint information can
lead to efficiency loss, let us consider the following example.
Example 1. Consider a network flow-control problem with
one link provider and one end user (see [15], [22]). The link
provider can allocate bandwidth x1 to the user, subject to
a capacity constraint c. The user achieves a throughput x2,
which equals Ax1 due to packet loss. We refer to A ∈ (0, 1] as
the packet delivery ratio. The link has a cost function of C(x1)
and the user has a utility function of U(x2). The corresponding
NUM Problem is
max
x1,x2
U(x2)− C(x1) s.t. x2 = Ax1︸ ︷︷ ︸
system constraint
,
local constraint︷ ︸︸ ︷
0 ≤ x1 ≤ c . (1)
Suppose that A = 1 and is known by the system designer,
while the parameter c is the link provider’s private information.
The link provider can misreport c, and it may be difficult for
the end user or the system designer to verify.
Let c be sufficiently large. Consider the traditional mech-
anism mentioned (e.g. [15], [22]), which determines the
throughput and a price per throughput p based on the link
provider’s reported value of c˜. At a “traditional” equilibrium,
the price p∗ equals an optimal dual variable corresponding to
the system constraint in (1) [15], [22]. That is, the equilibrium
(x∗, p∗) satisfies
x∗(c˜) = arg max
0≤x≤c˜
{U(x)− C (x)} , (2)
p∗(c˜) = U ′(x∗(c˜)). (3)
Hence, the user’s throughput is x∗2 = x
∗. The link provider
has allocation x∗1 = x
∗ and a profit of x∗p∗ − C(x∗).
TABLE II
NOTATION
Symbol Physical Meaning
I Set of agents
Ni Set of all constraints that agent i’s action has influence on
In Set of all agents whose actions have influence on constraint n
xi Action of agent i
hi,n(·) Influence function of agent i for system constraint n
En Inequality sign ≤ or equals sign = for system constraint n
Xi Local constraint for agent i
cn System constraint parameter for constraint n
Ui(·) Utility for agent i
As shown in Fig. 1, if the provider reports the true value
of c, the mechanism’s outcome (x∗, p∗), as shown in (2)-
(3), is the coordinates of the intersection point of the two
curves U ′(x) and C′(x), i.e., (xo, p∗(c)). This leads to a
profit of the link provider equal to the area of R plus P ,
i.e., x∗p∗ −
∫ xo
0
C′(x)dx. However, the provider can report a
much smaller c˜, in which case x∗ = c˜ according to (2) and
the price p∗ will increase. This results in a larger profit of the
link provider (which is equal to the area of B plus P ) than
the one under truthful report. On the other hand, it reduces the
network utility (which equals U(x∗2)−C(x
∗
1)) by the area of
Y plus R. Therefore, a strategic link provider will misreport
c˜ to increase its profit, leading to the efficiency loss.
We next show that misreporting A˜ can also lead to an
efficiency loss. At a “traditional” equilibrium, the price p∗ is
equal to an optimal dual variable corresponding to the system
constraint in (1) [15], [22]. That is, there exists an equilibrium
(x∗, p∗) satisfying
x∗(A˜) = argmax
x≥0
{
U(x)− C
(
x
A˜
)}
, (4)
p∗(A˜) = U ′(x∗(A˜)). (5)
Hence, the user’s throughput is x∗2 = x
∗. The link provider
has allocation x∗1 = x
∗/A and a profit of x∗p∗ − C(x∗/A).
As shown in Fig. 2, if the provider reports the true value
of A, the mechanism’s outcome (x∗, p∗), as shown in (4)-(5),
is the coordinates of the intersection point of the two curves
U ′(x) and C′(x/A)/A, i.e., (xo, p∗(A)). Similarly, this leads
to a profit of the link provider equal to the area of R plus
P , i.e., x∗p∗ − 1/A
∫ xo
0
C′(x/A)dx. However, the provider
can report a smaller A˜, in which case (x∗, p∗) becomes the
coordinates of the intersection point of the two curves U ′(x)
and C′(x/A˜)/A˜. This results in a higher price p∗ and thus a
larger profit of the link provider (which is equal to the area
of B plus P ) than the one under truthful report. On the other
hand, it reduces the network utility (which equals U(x∗2) −
C(x∗1)) by the areas of Y plus R, similar to the case in Fig.
1. Misreporting both types of constraint information leading
to an efficiency loss motivates this study.
IV. THE NETWORK UTILITY MAXIMIZATION PROBLEM
In this section, we introduce a network sharing framework
of Network Utility Maximization (NUM) with decomposabil-
ity structures. We first describe various components of the
model and then present the decomposable NUM (DeNUM)
problem.
5A. System Model
A network-sharing NUM framework consists of agents,
limited resources characterized by several constraints, and a
global objective.
1) Agents: We consider a networked system with a set I =
{1, ..., I} of agents. An agent can be either a service provider
or a user, as we illustrated in Section III. Each agent is rational
and selfish, and hence aims to maximize her own benefit.
Actions: We use xi = {xi,l, 1 ≤ l ≤ Li} ∈ RLi to
denote agent i’s (allocative) action, where Li is the dimension
of agent i’s action. The value of xi,l captures consump-
tion/sharing of one resource/service or a decision regarding
one task. Each agent i’s choice of xi is subject to a local
constraint characterized by a feasible set Xi, i.e., xi ∈ Xi.
Sharing/consuming no resource (or making no action) is
always a feasible choice, i.e., 0 ∈ Xi.
Utility Functions: Each agent i has a utility function Ui(xi),
which denotes her benefit (or the negative of her cost) as a
function of her action xi.
3
Remark 1. With a proper reformulation, our framework is
applicable to the case where agent i’s utility Ui(·) is a function
of other agents’ actions. Please refer to Appendix A-A for
detailed explanations.
2) System Constraints and Influences: Consider a set N =
{1, ..., N} of system constraints. Each constraint n couples a
set In ⊆ I of agents’ actions. Let hi,n(xi) denote agent i’s
influence to the system constraint n. We consider the following
additive form for system constraint n:∑
i∈In
hi,n(xi) En cn, (6)
where the symbol En, associated with constraint n, represents
either the equals sign = or the inequality sign ≤; cn denotes
a system constraint parameter for constraint n. Let Ni , {n :
i ∈ In} denote the set of constraints that agent i’s action has
influence on.
Remark 2. With a proper reformulation, our framework
is also applicable to the case where the influence function
couples all agents’ actions, as in Remark 1. Please refer to
Appendix A-B for detailed explanations.
An inequality constraint can capture, for example, resource
allocation budget constraints (such as capacity constraints).
In this case, a positive (negative) hi,n(xi) indicates a certain
amount of resource consumption (production).4 An equality
constraint usually captures the balancing constraints, such as
a network flow balance constraint (e.g. [8]–[10]) and a market
clearing constraint (e.g. [11]). We assume hi,n(0) = 0, i.e.,
idleness leads to zero influence to the system. Finally, the
additive form in constraint (6) is applicable in a large range
of networked applications (e.g. [8]–[12]).
3The utility is allowed to be negative and decreasing in some dimensions.
4It can also capture, for example, the interference to the networks, as we
will discuss in Section VIII.
3) Information Structure: We assume that Ui(·), hi,n(·),
and Xi are agent i’s private information that may not be
known by others. Though the structure of hi,n(·) is private,
we consider the following monitorability assumption:
Assumption 1 (Monitorable Influence). After agent i performs
her action xi, the network designer or some other agent in
In can observe the output value of the function hi,n(xi).
For instance, an agent or the network designer can ob-
serve the total amount of another agent’s resource consump-
tion/production (as illustrated by a concrete example in Ap-
pendix A-D) or the interference generated by another agent
(as illustrated in Section VIII). Such an assumption is also
motivated by the fact that the 5G network slice broker can
obtain access to network monitoring measurements such as
load and various key performance indicates [3]. We will further
discuss how to eliminate the need of Assumption 1 in Section
VII.
We assume that the system constraint parameter cn is
globally known. However, by a proper reformulation (i.e.,
introducing auxiliary system and local constraints), our frame-
work is also applicable to the case where some parameter cn
is only known by some agent. For detailed discussions, please
refer to Appendix A-C.
B. Network Utility Maximization Formulation:
The system designer is interested in solving the following
NUM Problems with a decomposition structure defined as:
Definition 1 (DeNUM: Decomposable NUM). A DeNUM
Problem has the following structures:
max
x
∑
i∈I
Ui(xi) (7a)
s.t.
∑
i∈In
hi,n(xi) En cn, ∀n ∈ N , (7b)
xi ∈ Xi, ∀i ∈ I. (7c)
We adopt the following standard assumptions to ensure
convexity, feasibility, and constraint regularity of the problem:
Assumption 2. The DeNUM Problem satisfies:
1) Each agent i’s utility function Ui(xi) is continuous,
strictly concave, and differentiable;5
2) Each agent i’s influence functions hi,n(xi) are contin-
uous and differentiable; hi,n(xi) is affine if En is =,
and it is convex if En is ≤;
3) The local constraint Xi is convex and compact;
4) The set of all feasible actions X˜ (where x ∈ X˜ iff all
xi satisfy (7b), (7c)) is non-empty.
Let relint(A) be the relative interior of the set A [47, Ch.
2.1.3]. We further adopt the following regularity assumption.
Assumption 3 (Slater’s Condition). There exists a feasible
solution x˜ = {x˜i}i∈I such that x˜i ∈ relint(Xi), ∀i ∈ I and∑
i∈In
hi,n(x˜i)
{
< cn, for every En representing ≤,
= cn, for every En representing =.
(8)
5We do not assume monotonicity for the utility functions.
6Assumptions 2 and 3 ensure the sufficiency and necessity
of the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions to characterize
the global optimal solution of the DeNUM Problem [47].
C. Desirable Mechanism Properties
It is well known that one can design a distributed algorithm
to efficiently solve the DeNUM Problem provided agents
are willing to follow the algorithm [6], as we will further
show in Section V-A. However, such an approach is not self-
enforcing since strategic agents may misreport information
or tampering with the algorithms. Hence, we need to design
economic mechanisms to induce network-utility maximizing
equilibria, under which each agent will maximize her local
payoff function that is determined by the mechanism. The eco-
nomic mechanisms should satisfy the following three desirable
economic properties and one technical property:
• (E1) Efficiency: The mechanism induces an equilibrium
that maximizes the network utility, i.e., achieves the
optimal solution of the DeNUM Problem.
• (E2) Individual Rationality: Every agent should not be
worse off by participating in the mechanism.
• (E3) Strong Budget Balance: The total payment from
some agents equals the reimbursements to all remaining
agents. That is, there is no need to inject or take money.
• (T1) Dynamic Stability: The mechanism admits a dis-
tributed iterative algorithm, along which the agents can
achieve the equilibrium.
We will first design a Nash mechanism to achieve the above
properties (E1)-(E3)6 as well as a corresponding distributed
algorithm that achieves (T1). We then design a dynamic
mechanism to achieve (E1), (E2), and (T1). It cannot achieve
(E3) due to the induced VCG-type taxation.
D. Conditions and Impossibility Results
In this subsection, we discuss the conditions where it is
possible for a mechanism to achieve the properties (E1)-(E3).
We then adopt the assumptions to rule out the impossible
scenarios.
1) Excludability: We adopt the following assumption:
Assumption 4 (Excludability). The system designer can ex-
clude each agent i from the system, which is equivalent to the
case where agent i can only choose an action from the set:
XOuti = {xi : xi ∈ Xi, hi,n(xi) En 0, ∀n ∈ N} . (9)
To understand (9), recall that a positive hi,n(xi) can repre-
sent consumption of a certain amount of resources. Intuitively,
the excludability means that the system designer can prevent
a non-paying agent from free-riding any network resource.
6As Section II mentioned, we do not seek for another well-known property
“truthfulness” (i.e., truthful report is a dominant strategy) since it is not
achievable together with (E1)-(E3) and may incur significant overheads.
Fortunately, most resources (or services) in networked sys-
tems are excludable.7 Moreover, almost all existing mecha-
nisms implicitly adopted Assumption 4 (e.g. [13]–[22]). The
reason is that non-excludability is one of the greatest enemies
preventing (E1)-(E3) from being possible (see [32], [40]).
Intuitively, if the agents can always access the resources, they
may opt out of any mechanism to avoid possible payments.
2) Impossibility Results: We present conditions regarding
parameters {cn} where no mechanism can achieve properties
(E1)-(E3) for every DeNUM Problem.
Proposition 1. No mechanism that can achieve both (E2) and
(E3) for all DeNUM Problems under one of the following
conditions:
• cn is negative for some n such that En is ≤;
• cn is non-zero for some n such that En is =.
Proof: Please see Appendix B-A.
Intuitively, each agent i can receive at least a utility of Ui(0)
after opting out of any mechanism.8 Under the conditions in
Proposition 1, the achievable network utility may be so limited
that someone must increase her payoff by opting out of any
mechanism. Therefore, we adopt the following assumption:
Assumption 5 (Feasibility of Null). Agents’ action profile x =
0 is a feasible solution to the DeNUM Problems, i.e., cn ≥ 0
if En is ≤ and cn = 0 if En is =.
V. THE DENUM MECHANISM
In this section, we propose the DeNUM Mechanism. We
first present the indirect decomposition method motivating the
DeNUM Mechanism and the key idea behind the DeNUM
Mechanism. We then formally present the DeNUM Mecha-
nism and show that it can achieve (E1)-(E3).
A. Indirect Problem Decomposition
We first present the indirect (dual) decomposition [6] that
serves as a distributed (pure) optimization method for solving
the DeNUM Problem when agents are obedient. We consider
to relax the constraints in (6) and then introduce auxiliary
variables yi = {yi,n} for each agent i and the corresponding
auxiliary constraints. The DeNUM Problem is equivalent to
the reformulated one as shown in the following result:
Lemma 1 (R-DeNUM: Reformulated Decomposable NUM).
The DeNUM Problem defined in Definition 1 is equivalent to
7Specifically, bandwidth, cloud services, contents, and electricity are intrin-
sically excludable. Moreover, many seemingly non-excludable resources have
been made excludable. For instance, licensed spectrum is excludable, since
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) imposed exclusive rights for a
licensed spectrum holder and provides legal protection against unauthorized
usage. Exceptions are wireless power in wireless power transfer network [31]
and network security investments [32].
8This is because hi,n(0) = 0, ∀n ∈ Ni and 0 ∈ Xi.
7the following R-DeNUM Problem:
max
x,y
∑
i∈I
Ui(xi) (10a)
s.t.
∑
i∈In
yi,n = cn, ∀n ∈ N , (10b)
hi,n(xi) En yi,n, ∀i ∈ I, n ∈ Ni, (10c)
xi ∈ Xi, ∀i ∈ I. (10d)
We can prove this lemma by showing the equivalence
of two problems’ KKT conditions. The key idea of this
reformulation is to partition the system constraints in (6)
into several individual constraints and re-impose each of
them to the corresponding agent. This constructs an indirect
decomposition structure [6].
To see this, we relax the constraint in (10b) and assign
λ = {λn}n∈N to be the dual variables of it. We can then
formulate the corresponding Lagrangian, which can be further
decomposed into I locally solvable subproblems. That is,
agent i’s local problem is:
gi(λ) , max
xi∈Xi,yi
Ui(xi)−
∑
n∈Ni
λn
(
yi,n −
cn
|In|
)
(11a)
s.t. hi,n(xi) En yi,n, ∀n ∈ Ni, (11b)
where we define gi(λ) as the local dual function. At the higher
layer, we obtain the optimal dual variable λo through solving
a master (global) dual problem, given by
λo = argmin
λ
∑
i∈I
gi(λ). (12)
Substituting λo into (11), we will have the optimal primary
variables (xoi ,y
o
i ) for each agent i’s local problem.
The above approach works only if agents are obedient.
The agent rationality and selfishness motivate us to propose
a mechanism to align strategic agents’ interests to the above
approach to solving the problem in (12).
B. Key Ideas Behind the DeNUM Mechanism
Traditionally, a mechanism consists of a message space and
an outcome function [30], and each agent needs to submit
a message. Such a mechanism is a tuple Γ˜ , (M, O),
where the set M is the space from which agents choose the
messages m; the outcome maps their message to the action
agents should take xˆ(m) , {xˆi(m)}i∈I and agents’ pay-
ments Π(m) , {Πi(m)}i∈I , i.e., O(m) , (xˆ(m),Π(m)).
However, to design a mechanism Γ˜ with constraint information
asymmetries, we need to find a mapping O(m) that not only
solves the DeNUM Problem but also incentivizes agents to
reveal their private information, which is challenging.
In this paper, we propose a new mechanism framework,
where a mechanism does not directly determine the allocation
outcome. Instead, each agent simultaneously submits a mes-
sage and selects her allocative action xi from an action set
determined by the mechanisms.9 Specifically, the considered
9Our proposed mechanism framework generalizes Γ˜, which corresponds to
the special case of our proposed framework where each agent’s action space
only contains one element (i.e., T (m) = {xˆ(m)}).
mechanism is a tuple Γ , (M, T (m),Π(m)): the set M
is the message space. The set T (m) , {Ti(m) ⊆ Xi}i∈I
characterizes each agent’s action space xi. A key feature (and
challenge of the analysis later on) is that T (m) depends not
only on Xi but also on some (unspecified) constraint deter-
mined by messages m announced by agents (which results
in coupling among agents). Function Π(m) describes agents’
payments (also called taxes in the proposed framework).
The advantages of such a mechanism framework are two-
fold. First, the computation of the allocation outcome is dis-
tributed and performed locally by agents. Second, by carefully
designing a mechanism, only the agents need to utilize the
private (utility and constraint) information for solving their
own local problems. This eliminates the necessity for revealing
agents’ constraint information through a mechanism.
C. DeNUM Mechanism and its Induced Game
1) Formal Mechanism Design: We introduce the DeNUM
Mechanism which describes the message space M, budgets
constraining agents’ actions T (m), and their taxes Π(m).
Mechanism 1 (DeNUM). The DeNUM Mechanism consists
of the following components:
• The message space M = ×i∈IMi: Each agent i ∈ I
submits a message mi = {mi,n}n∈Ni ∈ Mi , R
2×|Ni|
to the system designer: 10
mi,n = (pi,n, τi,n), (13)
where pi,n and τi,n denote agent i’s price proposal
and budget proposal, respectively. We denote all agents’
message profile as m = {mi}i∈I .
• Imposed Constraints: For the action xi for agent i ∈ I,
the system designer imposes an additional budget con-
straint on the agent’s influence hi,n(xi), denoted by
hi,n(xi) En ti,n(τn), n ∈ Ni, (14)
where τn = {τi,n}i∈In and ti,n is agent i’s budget
associated with system constraint n, denoted by
ti,n(τn) = τi,n −
∑
j∈In
τj,n − cn
|In|
. (15)
• Taxation Π: For each system constraint n ∈ Ni, each
agent i pays a tax of 11
πi,n(mn) (16)
= pω(n,i+1),n
(
ti,n(τn)−
cn
|In|
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
payment
+(pi,n − pω(n,i+1),n)
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
penalty
,
where mn = {mi,n}i∈In . Here ω(n, i + 1) denotes
the circular neighbor of agent i on constraint n. More
specifically, suppose i is the υ-th smallest index in In,
then12
ω(n, i+ 1) ,
{
the (υ + 1)-th smallest index in In, if υ 6= |In|,
the smallest index in In, otherwise.
10Note that we allow the price proposal pi,n to be negative, in which case
it represents a proposed reimbursement per unit of allocated budget.
11A negative tax corresponds to a reimbursement from the system designer.
12For example, ω(n, 3 + 1) = 5 when In = {2, 3, 5}.
8Agent i’s total tax is
Πi(m) =
∑
n∈Ni
πi,n(mn). (17)
In our DeNUM Mechanism, each agent should simultane-
ously submit two types of messages (price and budget) and
decide her action xi. For each system constraint n, proposal
τi,n denotes the budget ti,n that agent i demands; pi,n denotes
the price that agent i is willing to pay. Both Xi and the
constraints specified by (14)-(15) constrain agent i’s possible
strategy. Finally, each agent pays a tax (16)-(17) associated
with other agents’ price proposals and her own budgets.
Note that constraints in (14)-(15) can be either “hard”
physical constraints or “soft” contractual constraints. In the
latter case, each agent is still able to violate the constraints,
but such violation is detectable by comparing the output of
the function hi,n(xi) (by Assumption 1) and ti,n(τn), without
requiring the knowledge of the exact forms of hi,n(xi). Note
that agents are willing to monitor each other on behalf of the
system designer and report any violator. This is because one
agent’s violating action will harm the benefit of another, since
the latter may not access the whole budget as promised in (14).
Therefore, as far as the mechanism is concerned, we assume
that the constraints in (14)-(15) are “hard” and inviolable.
The taxation for each agent i in (16) consists of a payment
term for her budget and a penalty term. The payment term
regulates agents’ demands of the budget in such a way that
each agent’s payoff has a similar structure to the objective in
(11). The penalty term is motivated by [38], which penalizes
price proposal deviations to incentivize similar price proposals
and is designed to become zero at the induced equilibrium.
2) DeNUM Game: The above DeNUMMechanism induces
a DeNUM Game where each agent simultaneously decides
mi = {mi,n}n∈N and xi, aiming to maximize her utility
minus her tax in (17) and considering other agents’ decisions:
DeNUM Game. (Induced by the DeNUM Mechanism)
• Players: all agents in I;
• Strategy Space: for agent i ∈ I, her strategy space is
(xi,mi) ∈ Si(τ−i), where13
Si(τ−i) ,
{
(xi,mi) : xi ∈ Xi,mi ∈ R
2×|Ni|,
hi,n(xi) En ti,n(τ i; τ−i) , ∀n ∈ Ni} ; (18)
• (Quasi-linear) payoff function Ji(·): each agent i has a
payoff function
Ji(xi,m) , Ui(xi)−Πi(m). (19)
Different from the traditional mechanisms [30], the DeNUM
Mechanism induces a game where each agent’s strategy in-
cludes mi and xi chosen from coupled strategy spaces.
13The strategy space in (18) for each agent is always non-empty. This is
because hi,n(0) = 0 and each agent i can always submit an appropriate
τi,n to ensure ti,n(τ i; τ−i) = 0. Therefore, agents can always ensure the
feasibility of (18), regardless of other agents’ message m−i.
3) Generalized Nash Equilibrium: The game-theoretic so-
lution concept for the DeNUM Game is the generalized
Nash equilibrium (GNE) [41].14 This concept generalizes the
traditional NE since agent strategies impact not only other
agents’ payoffs but also other agents’ strategy space.
Definition 2 (Generalized Nash Equilibrium (GNE)). A GNE
of the DeNUM Game is a strategy profile (x∗,m∗) such that
for every agent i ∈ I and every strategy (xi,mi) ∈ Si(τ ∗−i),
Ji(x
∗
i ,m
∗
i ;m
∗
−i) ≥ Ji(xi,mi;m
∗
−i), (20)
where m∗−i , {m
∗
j}j 6=i is the GNE strategy profile of all
other agents except agent i.
D. GNE Analysis
1) GNE Price Proposals: For each agent i, her price
proposal only affects the penalty term in (16). We can verify
that each agent i will always choose pi,n = pω(n,i+1),n for
every system constraint n ∈ Ni to minimize the penalty. This
leads to the following result.
Lemma 2 (Common Price Proposals). The GNE price pro-
posals satisfy that, for each system constraint n,
p∗n , p
∗
i,n = p
∗
j,n, ∀i, j ∈ In. (21)
By Lemma 2, since every agent submits her price pro-
posals according to (21), every penalty term in (16) is
zero. In addition, the budgets determined in (15) ensure that∑
i∈In
ti,n(τn) = cn for every τn. It follows that
Proposition 2 (Budget Balance). The DeNUM Mechanism
satisfies the budget balance (E3), i.e.,
∑
i∈I Πi(m
∗) = 0.
2) Agent Payoff Maximization: By Lemma 2 and (20),
agents achieve a GNE if, under the properly selected common
price proposals {p∗n}n∈N , each agent i solves the following
convex Agent Payoff Maximization (APM) Problem:
max
xi∈Xi,τ i
Ui(xi)−
∑
n∈Ni
p∗nti,n(τ ) s.t. (14). (22)
In other words, the KKT conditions of the APM Problem
determine both {p∗n}n∈N and {(x
∗
i , τ
∗
i )}i∈I .
The APM Problem has a similar structure to the local
problem in (11). However, different from (11), each agent self-
enforcingly solves the APM Problem because it leads to her
maximal payoff at a GNE. In other words, the mechanism
aligns each agent’s interest with the decomposed optimization
problem in (11). Moreover, only agent i solving her APM
Problem requires the knowledge of Ui(·), hi,n(·), and Xi. This
resolves our main issue of information asymmetries and leads
to the following results.
Theorem 1 (Existence, Efficiency, and Full Implementation).
There exists at least one GNE in the DeNUM Game. When
14The standard GNE (or an NE) usually stands for a solution concept
for a game with complete information, which is not the case here. Instead,
we adopt the common interpretation in the literature of Nash mechanisms
(see [16], [17], [21], [22]). That is, a GNE is a “stationary” point of some
strategy updating processes (to be described in Section VI-A) that possesses
the equilibrium property in (20).
9Assumptions 1-3 hold, every GNE leads to the optimal solution
to the DeNUM Problem (E1).
Proof Sketch: For any optimal solution (xo,λo) of the R-
DeNUM Problem, a strategy profile (x∗,m∗) that satisfies
the following property is always a GNE: ∀(i, n) ∈ {(i, n) :
i ∈ In}, x∗i = x
o
i , τ
∗
i,n = hi,n(x
o
i ), and p
∗
i,n = λ
o
n. This
proves the existence of the GNE. Due to the similarity of the
structure between the APM Problem and the problem in (11),
we can show the equivalence between the KKT conditions of
the DeNUM Problem and those of all agents’ APM Problems
combined. Every GNE is thus a network-utility maximum.
Please refer to Appendix B-B for the complete proof.
Theorem 2 (Individual Rationality). When Assumptions 1-5
hold, the DeNUM Mechanism is individually rational (E2).
Proof Sketch: By Assumption 3, if agent i chooses
not to participate in the mechanism, her maximal pay-
off is maxxi∈XOuti Ui(xi). If agent i chooses to partici-
pate, she can always submit a message mˆi = (τˆ i,p
∗
i )
where τˆi,n =
∑
i6=j τ
∗
j,n−cn
I−1 , which leads to ti,n = 0.
Therefore, her maximal payoff at a GNE is at least
maxxi∈XOuti Ui(xi) +
∑
n∈Ni
p∗ncn/|In|. We then show that
the term
∑
n∈Ni
p∗ncn/|In| is always non-negative at a GNE.
Please refer to Appendix B-C for the complete proof.
In a nutshell, the DeNUM Mechanism achieves (E1)-(E3)
when Assumptions 1-5 hold.
VI. DISTRIBUTED ALGORITHM TO ACHIEVE THE GNE
In the DeNUM Game, each agent does not directly know
her GNE strategy satisfying (20) due to private information
regarding utilities and constraints. Hence, we propose the
DeNUM algorithm for agents to distributively update their
strategy and attain a GNE.15 We then prove its convergence.
A. The Iterative DeNUM Algorithm
Algorithm 1 shows the proposed iterative DeNUM Algo-
rithm for agents to distributively compute their GNE, with the
key steps explained in the following. Each agent i ∈ I first ini-
tializes her message mi[0] ∈ R2×|Ni| (line 2). The algorithm
iteratively computes each agent’s message and action until
convergence (lines 4-18). For each iteration, agents update
their messages and actions in a Gauss-Seidel fashion (lines 6-
14). That is, we divide one iteration into I sub-iterations (line
6). In each sub-iteration i, only agent i updates her messages
and actions, whereas the other agents keep theirs fixed.
In particular, in each sub-iteration i, each agent i updates
(xi[k], τ i[k],pi[k]) (in line 7) according to
15Due to the possibility of multiple primal solutions to the DeNUM Problem
and multiple dual solutions to the dual problem in (10), different GNEs may
lead to different individual payoffs and hence different agents might have
different preferences in terms of different equilibria. Note that if different
agents choose to play their corresponding equilibrium strategies corresponding
to different equilibria, then the overall strategy profile of all players may not
be an equilibrium. Therefore, reaching one GNE relies on agents’ consensus
by following the DeNUM Algorithm.
Algorithm 1: DeNUM Algorithm: Distributive Computa-
tion of the GNE
1 Initialize the iteration index k← 0;
2 Each agent i ∈ I randomly initializes
{pω(i−1,n),n[0]}n∈Ni and the system designer chooses
the stopping criterion ǫ;
3 conv flag← 0 # initialize the convergence flag;
4 while conv flag = 0 do
5 Set k ← k + 1;
6 for Each sub-iteration i ∈ I do
7 Each agent i updates (xi[k], τ i[k],pi[k]) by (23);
8 if ||pi[k]− pi[k − 1]||2 < ǫ||pi[k − 1]||2 then
9 conv count← conv count + 1;
10 else
11 conv count← 0;
12 end
13 Each agent i sends pi,n[k] to agent ω(i+1, n) for
every n ∈ Ni and conv count to agent i+ 1;
14 end
15 if conv count = I then
16 Set conv flag← 1 and broadcasts it;
17 end
18 end
19 Each agent i submits message mi to the system designer;
20 The system designer computes (ti(m),Πi(m))
according to (15)-(17) and sends them to every agent i;
(xi[k], τ i[k]) ∈ arg max
xi∈Xi
ti
{
Ui (xi)−
∑
n∈Ni
pω(i−1,n),n[k]ti,n
}
s.t. hi,n(xi) En ti,n, ti,n ≤ t
up
i,n, ∀n ∈ Ni, (23a)
pi,n[k] = p¯ω(i−1,n),n[k] + α[k]
(
τi,n[k]−
cn
|In|
)
, ∀n ∈ Ni,
(23b)
where p¯ω(i−1,n),n[k] satisfies
p¯ω(i−1,n),n[k] (24)
,
{
pω(i−1,n),n[k − 1], if i is the smallest index in In,
pω(i−1,n),n[k], otherwise,
and α[k] is a diminishing step size, given by α[k] = (1 +
β)/(k+β) for some non-negative constant β. The explanation
is as follows. First, each agent i maximizes her payoff function
in (23a), expecting that there is no penalty term in (16) and
her budgets equals to her budget proposals (i.e., ti = τ i). The
algorithm will satisfy these two expectations when it converges
as we will show. Second, each agent i sets the additional upper
bound tupi,n in (23a) by
tupi,n = max
xi∈Xi
hi,n(xi), ∀(i, n) ∈ {(i, n) : i ∈ In}, (25)
which ensures that the submitted {τ i[k]} are bounded. Such
an upper bound always exists due to the compactness of the
set Xi. Third, in (23b), each agent updates her price proposals
to resemble others’ most recent updated price proposals to
reduce the penalty in (16).
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Finally, each agent checks the termination criterion (line
16). The termination happens if the relative changes of all
agents’ price proposals in any continuous I sub-iterations
are small enough. When the algorithm converges, agents
submit their messages to the system designer to compute their
imposed constraints and taxes (lines 19-20).
Regarding the complexity of the algorithm, the system
designer has very few computation and communication over-
heads (O(IN) in line 20). Each agent also encounters a small
communication overhead (O(N) per iteration in line 13).
B. Convergence Analysis
To prove the convergence of Algorithm 1, we first establish
the connection between a GNE and the optimal primal-dual
solution of the R-DeNUM Problem in the following:
Theorem 3 (Equivalence). When Assumptions 1-3 hold, for
a given optimal primal-dual solution (xo,yo,λo) to the
R-DeNUM Problem in (10), the following strategy profile
(x∗, τ ∗,p∗) is a GNE: for all (i, n) ∈ {(i, n) : i ∈ In},
x∗i,n = x
o
i,n, τ
∗
i,n = y
o
i,n, p
∗
i,n = p
∗
n = λ
o
n, (26)
where p∗n is the common price proposal in Lemma 2.
The proof of Theorem 3 involves exploiting its KKT condi-
tions of the R-DeNUM Problem in (10) and those of the APM
Problems in (22).
The significance of Theorem 3 is two-fold. First, it provides
a new interpretation of the messages of the DeNUM Mech-
anism. Specifically, the budget proposals τ i play a role of
the auxiliary variables yi while each comment price proposal
p∗n plays a role of a dual variable λn. Second, Theorem 3
suggests that any distributed algorithm updating (x,m) to a
primal-dual solution also converges to a GNE of the DeNUM
Game.16 We prove the convergence next:
Proposition 3. When Assumptions 1-3 hold, the DeNUM
Algorithm converges to a GNE.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix B-D.
The proof of the proposition involves showing that the
DeNUM Algorithm 1 is an incremental subgradient based
algorithm [42] which updates a dual variable incrementally
in (23b). Such an algorithm is convergent when α[k] is a
diminishing step size and τ i[k] is bounded [42].
VII. THE DYNAMIC DENUM MECHANISM
The success of the DeNUM Mechanism relies on As-
sumption 1, i.e., the output values of each agent’s influence
functions hi,n(xi) are monitorable. In this section, we propose
the DyDeNUM Mechanism, a dynamic mechanism that can
achieve (E1)-(E2) and (T1) even if the influence functions are
not monitorable (hence without Assumption 1). The tradeoff
is that the DyDeNUM Mechanism is not guaranteed to satisfy
the budget balance (E3).
16Therefore, in addition to Algorithm 1, we can also adopt other algorithms
(e.g. those from [44] and [46]). Different from Algorithm 1, they operate in
the Jacobi (concurrent) and asynchronous fashion.
A. The DyDeNUM Mechanism
We formally introduce the DyDeNUMMechanism in Mech-
anism 2. Different from the DeNUM Mechanism, the DyDe-
NUM Mechanism is executed in a dynamic fashion with the
key steps introduced in the following.
Mechanism 2. Dynamic DeNUM Mechanism (DyDeNUM)
• Initialization: The system designer initializes taxes for
agents {Πi[0]}i∈I . Each agent initializes her price pro-
posals pi[0] = {pi,n[0] = C}n∈Ni for some common
constant C > 0.
• For each iteration k ∈ N,
– For each sub-iteration i ∈ I, each agent i updates
her message mi[k]:
∗ Demand update: Agent i ∈ I reports her desired
demand di[k] ∈ RLi to the system designer.
∗ Price proposal update: Agent i updates her price
proposal pi,n[k] and report it to her neighbor
ω(i+ 1, n), for each resource n ∈ Ni.
∗ Marginal utility report: Agent i sends a reported
marginal utility ∇ui[k] ∈ RLi to the system
designer.
– Taxation Π[k]: The system designer updates the
taxation for each agent i, given by
Πi[k] = Πi[k − 1] +
∑
j∈I/{i}
∇uj [k]
T (dj [k − 1]− dj [k]).
(27)
Each iteration of the DyDeNUM Mechanism consists of
I sub-iterations (similar to the DeNUM Algorithm). In each
sub-iteration i, each agent i should sequentially (in a Gauss-
Seidel manner) submit three types of messages including price
proposals, demand, and marginal utility. At the end of each
iteration, the system designer updates each agent’s tax in (27)
based on other agents’ reported price proposals and demands.
Given the tax in (27) and all other agents’ messages m−i,
each agent i aims at maximizing her long-term average payoff:
max
{mi[k]}k∈N
lim
K→∞
1
K
[
K∑
k=1
Ui(di[k])−Πi[k]
]
(28a)
s.t. di[k] ∈ Xi, ∀k ∈ N. (28b)
We will show that each agent is interested in updating and
reporting the message {mi[k]}k∈N in the following way: for
each iteration k ∈ N,
di[k] = arg max
xi∈Xi
[
Ui(xi)−
∑
n∈Ni
p¯ω(i−1,n),n[k]hi,n(xi)
]
,
(29)
pi,n[k] = (30)
p¯ω(i−1,n),n[k] + α[k]
(
hi,n(di[k])−
cn
|In|
)
, if En is =,[
p¯ω(i−1,n),n[k] + α[k]
(
hi,n(di[k])−
cn
|In|
)]+
, if En is ≤,
∇ui[k] = ∇xiUi(di[k]), (31)
where p¯ω(i−1,n),n[k] is defined in (24), and α[k] is the dimin-
ishing step size, given by α[k] = (1 + β)/(k + β) for some
non-negative constant β.
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We will soon show that the DyDeNUM Mechanism and
the updates in (29)-(31) converge to an optimal solution to
the DeNUM Problem and every agent following such updates
and reports is a Nash equilibrium.
B. Convergence and Network Utility Maximization
In this subsection, we study the properties of the DyDeNUM
mechanism.
Proposition 4 (Convergence). When Assumptions 2-3 hold, if
all agents update their messages {mi[k]} according to (29)-
(31), each agent i’s demand in (29) converges to the optimal
action to the DeNUM Problem, i.e., limK→∞ di[K]→ xoi .
Proof: Please refer to Appendix B-E.
The convergence proof of Proposition 4 is similar to
Proposition 3. Specifically, the updates according to (29)-
(31) together with the DyDeNUM Mechanism essentially
constitute an incremental subgradient method [42], similar to
the DeNUM Algorithm.
Different from the DeNUM Algorithm that distributively
solves the dual problem with the indirect decomposition,
the DyDeNUM Mechanism with (29)-(31) exploits a direct
decomposition structure [6].17 In other words, the DyDeNUM
Mechanism does not require auxiliary constraints associated
with each agent’s influence functions {hi,n(xi)}n∈Ni as in
the DeNUM Mechanism and R-DeNUM Problem in (10). This
eliminates the necessity of Assumption 1, which is essential
for imposing auxiliary constraints. We are ready to present the
following result.
Theorem 4 (Nash Equilibrium). When Assumptions 2-3 hold,
every agent chooses to update and report according to (29)-
(31) is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix B-F.
Theorem 4 implies that the updating and reporting according
to (29)-(31) is each agent i’s optimal strategy, when all other
agents select to do so. Intuitively, supposing that all agents are
reporting and updating by (29)-(31), each agent i’s tax is
lim
k→∞
Πi[k] = Πi[0]−
∞∑
t=0
∑
j 6=i
∇xjUj(dj [k])
T (dj [k + 1]− dj [k])
≅ Πi[0]−
∑
j 6=i
∫ ∞
0
∇xjUj(·)
T ddj(k)
= Πi[0]−
∑
j 6=i
Uj(dj [∞]) +
∑
j 6=i
Uj(dj [0]), (32)
where the approximation in the second line of (32) is con-
trolled by the step size α[k] in (30). That is, when the initial
step size α[0] is small enough, so is the difference between
dj [k + 1] and dj [k]. This validates the approximation.
We demonstrate the approximation in Fig. 3, where the
step size α[k] is 350/(k + 2000). As shown in Fig. 3, the
sum area of the rectangles
∑∞
t=0 U
′
i(di[k])(di[k + 1]− di[k])
is a good approximation to the integral
∫∞
0 U
′
i(·)ddi(k) =
Ui(di[∞]) − Ui(di[0]), since the relative error is less than
17 We present the detailed formulation and analysis in Appendix B-E1.
di[0] di[1] di[ ]
U'i(xi)
p
p (i-1)[0]
xi
Fig. 3. An illustration of the approximation in Eq. (32). The sum area of
the rectangles
∑
∞
t=0 U
′
i
(di[k])(di[k+1]− di[k]) approximates the integral∫
∞
0
U ′
i
(·)ddi(k) = Ui(di[∞])− Ui(di[0]).
3%.18 The algorithm converges in 31 iterations. It is possible
to further adjust the step size α[k] to make tradeoffs between
the error and the convergence speed.
Each agent chooses messages {mi[k]}k∈N to maximize
her convergent payoff, given by Ui(di[∞]) − Πi[∞]. From
(32), since Πi[0] and
∑
j 6=i Uj(dj [0]) are constant, each agent
chooses to maximize her utility Ui(di[∞]) plus the term∑
j 6=i Uj(dj [∞]), which equals the network utility. Moreover,
from Proposition 4, if all agents follow the updates in (29)-
(31), the DyDeNUM Mechanism achieves the maximal net-
work utility. Therefore, when all agents other than i update
and report according to (29)-(31), it is always agent i’s optimal
strategy to do so.
C. Computation of the Initial Tax and Individual Rationality
In this subsection, we discuss that it is possible to further de-
sign {Πi[0]}i∈I in a way to achieve the individual rationality
(E2). Specifically, we can consider a distributed algorithm sim-
ilar to the updates in (29)-(31). Such an algorithm computes
the maximal network utility of the system excluding agent
i.19 The resulted initial tax Πi[0] together with (32) makes
each agent i receive a VCG-type tax, and can thus achieve the
individual rationality as follows.
Proposition 5. When Assumptions 2-5 hold, the DyDeNUM
Mechanism satisfies the individual rationality (E2).
Proof: Please refer to Appendix B-G.
However, our DyDeNUM Mechanism cannot guarantee the
budget balance, which is one of the disadvantages of the
VCG-type taxation. In a nutshell, the DyDeNUM Mechanism
exploits the direct composition structure to avoid the necessity
of Assumption 1, however, at the cost of the budget balance.
VIII. APPLICATION: FOG-BASED USER-PROVIDED
NETWORK
In this section, we consider the fog-based user-provided net-
work (UPN) as a concrete example of the DeNUM framework,
to demonstrate the effectiveness of the DeNUM Mechanism,
the DeNUM Algorithm, and the DyDeNUMMechanism. Such
18The relative error is defined as |Ui(di[∞]) − Ui(di[0]) −∑
∞
t=0 U
′
i(di[k])(di[k+ 1]− di[k])|/(Ui(di[∞])− Ui(di[0])).
19Due to the space limit, we present the details of such an algorithm in
Appendix B-G1.
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an application is motivated by the Open Garden framework
[10], [45]. As shown in Fig. 4, in a UPN, near-by agents (who
are mobile users) can form a mesh network through Bluetooth
or Wi-Fi Direct, and share their Internet access capabilities
among each other.
UPNs can exploit diverse network resources and thus im-
prove the overall network performance. However, the success
of such services relies on an appropriate economic mechanism
that can provide incentives for providing services and cope
with information asymmetries.20
A. System Model
Wireless mesh network [10]. Consider a mesh network that
is described by a directed graph G = (I, E), where I denotes
the set of users and E denotes the set of communication links.
We define B(i←j) as the set of all direct links that will interfere
with link (i← j). Let Cij be the capacity of link (i← j).
User decisions. Let xi←j(n) denote the amount of data
user j’s to her one-hop downstream neighbor i, where (n)
represents that such a unicast session originates from the
Internet (e.g., a web/content server) and will end at user n ∈ I.
Let xIni = {xi←j(n)}j∈IIn(i),n∈I be user i’s upstream data
vector and let xOuti = {xj←i(n)}j∈IOut(i),n∈I denote user
i’s downstream data vector, where IIn(i) and IOut(i) are
sets of user i’s upstream and downstream one-hop neighbors,
respectively. Let yi(n) be the amount of data user’s i down-
loaded from the Internet for user n. Based on the protocol
interference model [10], we assume that a transmission over
link (i← j) ∈ E is successful only if all other links (k ← m)
in B(i←j) are idle. That is, user traffic decisions need to satisfy∑
n∈I
xi←j(n)
Cij
+
∑
(k←m)∈B(i←j)
∑
n∈I
xk←m(n)
Ckm
≤ 1,
∀(i← j) ∈ E . (33)
This means that in each time period (the length of which is
normalized to 1), the total amount of transmission time of link
(i ← j) and all links in (k ← m) ∈ B(i←j) cannot exceed
1. In our DeNUM framework, constraint (33) belongs to a
system constraint.
User utility and cost. Each user i has an increasing and
strictly concave utility Ui(ri), where ri is the user i’s received
data, given by ri(x
In
i , yi(i)) =
∑
j∈IIn(i) xi←j(i) + yi(i).
Each user has an increasing strictly convex cost function
Ci(yi,x
Out
i ), which captures the energy consumption and
payments of the mobile date services.
Specifically, each user i ∈ I has a maximum energy budget
Ei. Let e
s
j←i be the energy that user i consumes when she
sends one byte to j. Let eri←j be the energy that user i
consumes when she receives one byte from user j. Finally,
e0i is an energy consumption when node i downloads one
20Only one existing work considers an incentive mechanism for achiev-
ing the optimum of the corresponding DeNUM Problem, but assumes the
complete information (of both utility and constraint information) [10]. Note
that even without considering information asymmetries of constraints, existing
mechanisms (e.g. [13]–[22]) are not applicable to such an application.
Specifically, such an application consists of more complicated constraints than
those in [13]–[21], whereas this is no convergent algorithm in [22].
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Fig. 4. Examples of agent interactions in the fog-based UPNs. Each agent
can concurrently consume data over multiple and multi-hop paths, and serve
as a relay/gateway for other agents.
byte from the Internet. The total consumed energy ei for each
user i thus is:
ei =
∑
j∈IIn(i)
eri←j
∑
n∈I
xi←j(n) +
∑
j∈IOut(i)
esj←i
∑
n∈I
xj←i(n)
+ e0i
∑
n∈I
yi(n). (34)
The energy cost function is given by [10]
Ci(ei) =
δi
Ei − ei
, (35)
where δi is a normalization parameter indicating user i’s
sensitivity in energy consumption.
We define each user i’s payoff as,
Ji(ri,yi,x
Out
i ,x
In
i ) , Ui(ri(x
In
i , yi(i)))− Ci(yi,x
Out
i ), (36)
which is strictly concave.
B. Problem Formulation
Note that users’ utilities are coupled through their decision
variables x = {xi←j(n)}(i←j)∈E,n∈I . Hence, we further
introduce auxiliary variables xr = {xri←j(n)}(i←j)∈E,n∈I
and xs = {xsi←j(n)}(i←j)∈E,n∈I , where x
s
i←j(n) is agent
j’s decision variable (of sending data) and xri←j(n) is
user i’s decision variable (of receiving data). Let xr,Ini =
{xri←j(n)}j∈IIn(i),n∈I be user i’s upstream data vector and let
x
s,Out
i = {x
s
j←i(n)}j∈IOut(i),n∈I denote user i’s downstream
data vector.
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We formulate the DeNUM problem as
max
r,xs,xr,y
∑
i∈I
[
Ui(ri(x
r,In
i , yi(i)))− Ci(yi,x
s,Out
i )
]
(37a)
s.t. ri =
∑
j∈IIn(i)
xri←j(i) + yi(i), ∀i ∈ I, (37b)
∑
n∈I
yi(n) ≤ C0i, ∀i ∈ I, (37c)
∑
n∈I

xsi←j(n)
Cij
+
∑
(k←m)∈B(i←j)
xsk←m(n)
Ckm

 ≤ 1,
∀(i← j) ∈ E , (37d)
yi(n) +
∑
j∈IIn(i)
xri←j(n) =
∑
j∈IOut(i)
xsj←i(n),
∀i, n ∈ I, n 6= i, (37e)
xsi←j(n) = x
r
i←j(n), ∀(i← j) ∈ E . (37f)
Constraint (37c) characterizes agent i’s downlink capacity con-
straint with C0i being user i’s downlink capacity. Constraint
(37f) is the consistency constraint that equalizes the decision
variables of user i and user j.
In such a formulation, the constraints in (37b)-(37c) and
(37e) are individual constraints whereas the constraints in
(37d) and (37f) are system constraints.
C. Numerical Study
1) Simulation Setup: In this subsection, we consider a
setting with 5 agents where agent 2 does not have an Internet
connection. Every user i ∈ I has an α-fair utility function
Ui(ri) = r
1−αi
i /(1−αi), which is widely used in the literature
[48]. Parameters αi ∈ [0, 1] represent the willingness to pay
of the different utilities.
User energy consumption model is based on empirical data.
Specifically, we consider a set of |I| = 5 users, randomly
placed in a geographic area, and study their interactions for a
time period of T = 120 seconds. We assume that users com-
municate with each other using WiFi Direct. The achievable
capacity between two users decreases with their distance dij .
We set the WiFi Direct capacity to be Cij = 100 log(1 +
0.9/d2ij). Users are placed in the [0, 30m] × [0, 30m] plane
randomly, with a uniform distribution.
For mobile devices, the energy consumed by a data transfer
is proportional to the size of the data and the transmission
power level. Typically, the energy consumption (per MByte)
of WiFi transmissions is smaller compared to LTE transmis-
sions, which, in turn, is smaller than 3G transmissions. We
consider here an average energy consumption of e0i = 100
Joules/MByte when user i has a 3G Internet access connection,
e0i = 100 Joules/MByte, e0i = 4.65 Joules/MByte for an
LTE connection, and e0i = 2.85 Joules/MByte for a WiFi
connection [49]–[51]. For WiFi direct links, we assume that
the energy consumption per MByte increases with the distance
(since the achievable rate decreases with the distance), in the
form of esi←j = (2.77 + 0.008dij) Joules/MByte.
We consider a setting where user 1 has a LTE con-
nection, user 2 does not have connection, users 3 and 4
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Fig. 5. Simulation results of a UPN with 5 agents: (a) evolution of the
network utility produced by the DeNUM Algorithm and the DyDeNUM
Mechanism; (b) payoffs and budget deficiency (‘BD’) due to compensations
achieved/incurred by the DeNUM Mechanism, the DyDeNUM Mechanism,
and a benchmark solution.
have 3G connections, and user 5 have WiFi connections.
Specifically, the downlink capacities for all agents are C0i =
{12.7, 0.0, 1.0, 1.0, 4.12}Mbps, respectively, which are based
on the field experiments in [52]–[54].
2) Simulation Results: In Fig. 5 (a), we plot agents’ net-
work utility achieved by the DeNUM Algorithm and the
DyDeNUM Mechanism in each iteration. We see that the
DeNUM Mechanism converges to the offline optimum within
20 iterations and the DyDeNUM Mechanism converges within
60 iterations. The DyDeNUM Mechanism converges more
slowly since it requires a small step size in (30) to achieve a
reasonable approximation in (32). In addition, before the con-
vergence, the network utility is even larger than the respective
optimal value, which is because the produced aggregate payoff
is not feasible until convergence.
Second, in Fig. 5 (b), we consider a benchmark scheme in
which each agent can only access her own cellular downlink
(which is equivalent to not participating in any mechanism and
bear a constraint in (9)). We study the performances of the
DeNUM Mechanism and the DyDeNUM Mechanism, com-
pared with the benchmark.21 We observe that, for each agent i,
both mechanisms always improve upon the benchmark payoff,
which implies that both mechanisms achieve the individual
rationality (E2). In addition, the DeNUMMechanism improves
the average payoff by 34%. Although both the DyDeNUM
Mechanism and the DeNUM Mechanism achieve the same
maximal network utility, the DyDeNUM Mechanism achieves
a higher payoff for each agent. This is because the system
designer needs to compensate each agent to participate in
the DyDeNUM Mechanism and therefore incurs a budget
deficiency, as also shown in Fig. 5 (b).
IX. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed a new economic mechanism
framework for solving the decomposable NUM Problems
in network sharing. Our proposed DeNUM Mechanism can
cope with agents’ strategic behaviors and private utility and
constraint information, with the desirable economic properties
including efficiency, individual rationality, and budget balance.
In addition, we proposed a distributed low-complexity De-
NUM Algorithm provably convergent to the equilibrium of the
DeNUM Game. We further designed a DyDeNUMMechanism
21The results represent the average obtained over 100 experiments for
different user locations and hence user distances.
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that achieve the network utility maxima even if the monitorable
influence assumption is not satisfied but at the cost of the
balanced budget. There are several directions for extensions.
Since our mechanisms are susceptible to collusive agents, one
may ask how to design group-strategyproof mechanisms for
the NUM framework.
APPENDIX A
MODEL EXTENSIONS
A. Decoupling of Coupled Utilities
To decouple the coupled agents’ utilities, we can refor-
mulate the problem by introducing auxiliary variables and
auxiliary consistency equality constraints. We consider the
following illustrative example:
Example 2. Suppose there are two agents having the coupled
utilities U1(x1,y) and U2(x2,y), respectively. The DeNUM
Problem is
max
x1,x2,y
U1(x1,y) + U2(x2,y). (38)
To decouple the objectives, we can introduce the auxiliary
variables y1 and y2 and an additional equality system con-
straint. We hence have the following equivalent reformulation:
max
x1,y1,x2,y2
U1(x1,y1) + U2(x2,y2) (39a)
s.t. y1 = y2. (39b)
The reformulation is not only equivalent to (38) but also can be
captured by the decoupled formulation of the DeNUM Problem
in (7).
B. Decoupling of Coupled System Constraints
To decouple the coupled agents’ system constraints, we can
reformulate the problem by introducing auxiliary variables and
auxiliary consistency equality constraints, similar as in Ap-
pendix A-A. We consider the following illustrative example:
Example 3. Suppose there are two agents having the coupled
utilities U1(x1,y) and U2(x2,y), respectively. The DeNUM
Problem is
max
x1,x2
U1(x1) + U2(x2) (40)
s.t. h(x1,x2) E c. (41)
To decouple the system constraint in (41), we can introduce
the auxiliary variables y1 and y2, auxiliary local constraints
for two agents, an additional equality system constraint. We
hence have the following equivalent reformulation.
max
x1,y1,x2,y2
U1(x1,y1) + U2(x2,y2) (42a)
s.t. y1 = y2, (42b)
h(xi,yi) E c, ∀i ∈ {1, 2}. (42c)
The reformulation is not only equivalent to (38) but also can be
captured by the decoupled formulation of the DeNUM Problem
in (7).
C. Private System Constraint Parameters
To tackle with the private system constraint parameters, we
can introduce auxiliary local constraint and auxiliary equality
system constraint. We use the following example to illustrate
this.
Example 4. Consider the following DeNUM Problem:
max
x1,x2
U1(x1) + U2(x2) (43a)
s.t. x1 ∈ X1, (43b)
h1(x1) + h2(x2) ≤ c. (43c)
Suppose parameter c is agent 1’s private information. Let us
introduce an auxiliary variable y and Xˆ1 = {(x1, y) : x1 ∈
X1, h1(x1) + y ≤ c}. Consider the following reformulated
problem:
max
x1,x2,y
U1(x1, y) + U2(x2) (44a)
s.t. (x1, y) ∈ Xˆ1 (44b)
h2(x2)− y = 0. (44c)
We see that such reformulation is equivalent to (43a) and can
be captured by the DeNUM Problem in (7), since the new
system constraint’s budget is globally known as 0.
D. An Example of the Decomposable NUM Problem
We consider an illustrative network sharing example to show
that a practical DeNUM Problem fits in the aforementioned
setting:
Example 5. Consider a fog computing system with 2 agents
and CPU and RAM budget constraints. Agent 1 is the data
center owner and agent 2 requires a fixed amount of each
resource to accomplish two types of jobs. We assume that both
types of jobs are divisible. Agent 2 requires 1 CPU and 4 GB
of RAM for each unit amount of job a and 3 CPU and 2 GB of
RAM for each unit amount of job b. Agent 2 has 9 CPUs and
18 GB of RAM. The NUM Problem is therefore formulated as
max
x1,x2
U1(x1)− C(x2) (45a)
s.t. x1,a + 3x1,b − x2,C = 0 (45b)
4x1,a + 2x1,b − x2,R = 0 (45c)
x1  0, x2,C ≤ 9, x2,R ≤ 18 (45d)
Suppose that agent 1 provides x1,C CPUs and x1,R GB of
RAM; the accomplished amounts of jobs a and b for agent
2 are x2,a and x2,b. Hence, agent 1’s local constraint is
X1 = {(x1,C, x1,R) : 0 ≤ x1,C ≤ 9, 0 ≤ x1,R ≤ 18}
which is not known by others; agent 2’s influences functions
are h2,1(x2) = x2,a + 3x2,b and h2,2(x2) = 4x2,a + 2x2,b
for the two system constraints, respectively, indicating that
the action of accomplishing jobs consuming the resources.
Note that, in this scenario, agent 2 may not know agent
1’s resource budget and agent 1 may not know how many
resources each job requires (local constraints and influence
functions are unknown). But agent 1 can observe how many
resources are consumed afterwards (Assumption 1 is satisfied
since the output of the influence functions are monitorable).
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APPENDIX B
PROOFS
A. Proof of Proposition 1
To prove Proposition 1, we first prove the following lemma:
Lemma 3. If the maximal achievable network utility is less
than
∑
i∈I Ui(0), no mechanism can yield (E2) and (E3).
The intuition is that the constraint in (9) ensures each
agent can achieves at least a
∑
i∈I Ui(0) after opting out of
the mechanism. If the maximal achievable network utility is
lower than
∑
i∈I Ui(0), no money injection (budget balance)
leads to that circumstance where at least one agent is worse
off than receiving Ui(0). Note that this result applies to all
(game-theoretic) solution concepts, not limited to the Nash
equilibrium or the GNE.
Proof: Let (x∗,Π∗) be an equilibrium (not necessarily
an Nash equilibrium or a GNE) actions and payments of a
mechanism. In order to achieve the individual rationality, we
must have
Ui(x
∗
i )−Π
∗
i ≥ max
xi∈XOuti
Ui(xi). (46)
By the definition of XOuti in (9) and the fact that hi,n(xi) =
Ui(xi) = 0, for all (i, n) ∈ {(i, n) : i ∈ In}, it follows that
Ui(x
∗
i )−Π
∗
i ≥ max
xi∈XOuti
Ui(xi) ≥ Ui(0). (47)
To achieve the (weak) budget balance (which is a ), we have∑
i∈I Π
∗
i = 0. Hence, we must have∑
i∈I
Ui(x
∗
i )−
∑
i∈I
Π∗i ≥
∑
i∈I
Ui(x
∗
i ) ≥
∑
i∈I
Ui(0), (48)
which implies that weak budget balance, individual rationality,
and social optimum at any equilibrium cannot be satisfies
when the maximal achievable network utility (social welfare)
is negative, no matter what mechanism rules are.
We then prove the proposition by construction, showing that
(E2) and (E3) cannot be satisfied in two examples:
1) Consider a DeNUM Problem:
max
x
∑
i∈I
log(1 + xi) s.t.
∑
i∈I
xi E c. (49)
The optimal solution is x∗i = c/I for each i ∈ I
regardless of the fact that the constraint is equality or
inequality. The maximal network utility is I log(1+c/I),
which is negative (less than
∑
i∈I Ui(0) = 0) if and
only if c is negative. Therefore, according to Lemma 3,
in this example, no mechanism that can yield (E2) and
(E3).
2) Consider an another NUM problem:
max
x1,x2
log(1 + x1) + log(1 + x2), (50a)
s.t.
[
1 1
1 0.5
] [
x1
x2
]
=
[
0
0.25
]
. (50b)
There is only one feasible (and hence the optimal)
solution (x∗1 = 0.5, x
∗
2 = −0.5), which leads to a
negative network utility (less than
∑
i∈I Ui(0) = 0).
Hence, by Lemma 3, in this instance, no mechanism
that can yield (E2) and (E3).
To sum up, the first example shows that when c is negative,
it is possible that the properties in (E2) and (E3) cannot be
satisfied at the same time for both equality and inequality
constraints. The second example shows that, in an equality
constraint case, no mechanism that can yield (E2) and (E3).
Combining the results of the two cases, we complete the proof.
B. Proof of Theorem 1
Let fXi(xi) denote a convex and continuously differentiable
function that characterizes the set Xi as, xi ∈ Xi if and
only if fXi(xi) ≤ 0.
22 Since the DeNUM Problem is convex
and satisfies the Slater’s condition, the DeNUM Problem’s
sufficient and necessary KKT conditions for optimality are,
for any (i, n) ∈ {(i, n) : i ∈ In},
∇xiUi(xi)−
∑
n∈Ni
λi,n∇xihi,n(xi)− γi∇xifXi(xi) = 0, (51a)
Ξn (λn)
(∑
i∈I
hi,n(xi)− cn
)
= 0, (51b)
∑
i∈I
hi,n(xi) Encn,
(51c)
γifXi(xi) = 0, (51d)
Ξn(λn), γi ≥ 0, (51e)
fXi(xi) ≤ 0, (51f)
where
Ξn(a) ,
{
a, if En is ≤,
1, if En is = .
(52)
Let (xo,λo,γo) denote the solution to the KKT conditions in
(51).
On the other hand, we reformulate agent i’s APM Problem
into the following equivalent form:
max
xi∈Xi,τ i,ti
Ui(xi)−
∑
n∈Ni
p∗nti,n (53a)
s.t. hi,n(xi) En ti,n, ∀n ∈ Ni, (53b)
ti,n = τi,n −
∑
j∈In
τj,n − cn
|In|
, ∀n ∈ Ni. (53c)
More specifically, we assume that ti is also agent i’s decision
variable and introduce the constraint in (53c). It is readily
verified that the Problem in (53) is convex and the correspond-
ing Slater’s conditions are also satisfied (by Assumption 2).
22By [47], there always exists such a function fXi (xi) for any convex set
Xi.
16
Therefore, the sufficient and necessary KKT conditions for
each agent i’s APM Problem are, for each n ∈ Ni,
∇xiUi(xi)−
∑
n∈Ni
λi,n∇xihi,n(xi)− γi∇xifXi(xi) = 0, (54a)
λi,n − p
∗
n = 0, (54b)
Ξn (λi,n) (hi,n(xi)− ti,n) = 0, (54c)
hi,n(xi) En ti,n,
(54d)
γifXi(xi) = 0, (54e)
Ξn(λi,n), γi ≥ 0, (54f)
fXi(xi) ≤ 0, (54g)
where λi,n is the dual variables corresponding to con-
straints in (53b). Agents’ GNE decisions for described by
(x∗, {λi,n}∗i,n, t
∗,γ∗) satisfy (54) and that
∑
i∈In
t∗i,n = cn
due to (14). We are ready to prove the existence and efficiency
of the GNEs.
1) Existence: Assumption 2 ensures that there exists an
optimal solution to the DeNUM Problem. For any (xo,λo,γo)
to the KKT conditions in (51), we will show that the strategy
profile (x∗,m∗) such that, for all (i, n) ∈ {(i, n) : i ∈ In},
x∗i = x
o
i , τ
∗
i,n = hi,n(x
o
i ), p
∗
i,n = λ
o
n, (55)
is a GNE of the DeNUM Game. First, it is easy to see
that (55) and (51) assure (54a), (54e), and (54f). In addition,
let ti,n satisfy (14). Then, we see that hi,n(x
o
i ) = ti,n if∑
i hi,n(x
o
i ) = cn and hi,n(x
o
i ) < ti,n if
∑
i hi,n(x
o
i ) < cn,
which satisfies the conditions in (54c) and (54d). Therefore,
there exists at least one GNE.23
2) Efficiency: It is readily verified that, (x∗, {λn = p
∗
n =
λ∗i,n},γ
∗) also satisfies the conditions in (51a), (51d), and
(51e). In addition,
∑
i∈In
t∗i,n = cn together with (54c) and
(54d) further indicates that (x∗, {λn = p∗n = λ
∗
i,n},γ
∗) also
satisfies (51b) and (51c). Therefore, any GNE leads to the
optimal solution.
C. Proof of Theorem 2
The main idea of the proof of Theorem 2 is to show that,
regardless of other agents’ strategies, there always exists a
strategy (xi,mi) for each agent i that yields exactly the same
payoff as no participating the mechanism.
We define Vi(m) , maxxi∈X˜i(mi;m−i) Ji(xi,mi). From
(21), at a GNE, agent i’s payoff can be rewritten as
Vi(m
∗) , max
mi
xi∈X˜i(mi;m
∗
−i)
Ji(xi,m
∗). (56)
At a GNE, agent i can always submit her message mˆi =
(τˆ i,p
∗
i ) where τˆi,n =
∑
i6=j τ
∗
j,n−cn
I−1 , which leads to ti,n = 0.
Vi(m
∗) ≥ Vi(mˆi;m
∗
−i) = max
xi∈X˜i(mi;m∗−i)
Ui(xi) +
∑
n∈Ni
p∗ncn
|In|
.
(57)
23There are multiple existent GNEs in general, mainly resulting from the
possibility of multiple xo and λo.
By Assumption 3, agent i’s maximal payoff is
V Outi , max
xi∈XOuti
Ui(xi). (58)
Note that XOuti = {xi : xi ∈ Xi, hi,n(xi) En 0, ∀n ∈ N} =
X˜i(mi;m∗−i). In addition, if En is ≤, then p
∗
n = λ
∗
n ≥ 0 and
cn ≥ 0 due to Assumption 5; if En is =, then cn = 0 due to
Assumption 5. Therefore, we have that
∑
n∈N p
∗
ncn/|In| ≥ 0.
Thus, the GNE payoff for every agent i always satisfies
Vi(m
∗) ≥ V Outi , (59)
which demonstrates the individual rationality (E2).
D. Proof of Proposition 3
Algorithm 1 performs in a similar fashion as the incremental
subgradient method does in [42]. Specifically, from [42],
agents update the dual variable λ to solve the dual problem
in (12):
λ[k + 1] = p˜I [k], (60)
with p˜i[k] ∈ R
N being the local dual variable obtained as
p˜i[k + 1] (61)
=
{
p˜I [k]− α[k + 1]di,n(p˜I [k]), if i = 1,
p˜i−1[k + 1]− α[k + 1]di,n(p˜i−1[k + 1]), if i > 1.
We define zi(λ) ∈ ∂gi(λ) as agent i’s local subgradient, given
by
zi,n(λ) =
{
t∗i,n −
cn
|In|
, if i ∈ In,
0, otherwise,
(62)
where
(x∗i , t
∗
i ) ∈ arg max
xi∈Xi
ti
{
Ui (xi)−
∑
n∈Ni
p¯ω(i−1,n),n[k]ti,n
}
(63a)
s.t. hi,n(xi) En ti,n, ti,n ≤ t
up
i,n, ∀n ∈ Ni.
(63b)
The fact that zi,n = 0 if i /∈ In indicates that
p˜i,n[k + 1] (64)
=


p˜ω(i−1,n),n[k] + α[k + 1]zi,n(p˜ω(i−1,n)[k]),
if i = minj∈In j,
p˜ω(i−1,n),n[k + 1] + α[k + 1]zi,n(p˜ω(i−1,n)[k + 1]),
otherwise.
Comparing (63)-(64) with (23a)-(23b), we see that the above
mentioned algorithm of the incremental subgradient method is
equivalent to the DeNUM Algorithm.
Next, we prove that the subgradient zi,n(λ) for every agent
i is bounded. Due to constraints in (23a) and (63b), the
subgradient zi,n(λ) is bounded if hi,n(xi) > −∞ for all
xi ∈ Xi. Note that the compactness of Xi due to Assumption
1 ensures that {hi,n} are also bounded. This leads to the
boundedness of the subgradients.
Therefore, to prove the convergence of Algorithm 1, it
suffices to prove the convergence of the sequence {λ[k]} to the
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optimal dual variables of the dual problem minλ
∑
i∈I gi(λ).
We first adopt the following lemma in [42].
Lemma 4. Let {λ[k]} be the sequence generated by (60). We
have that, for all y ∈ RN and k ∈ N,
||λ[k + 1]− y||2
≤ ||λ[k]− y||2 − 2α[k] (g(λ[k])− g(y))− α[k]2Cˆ2,
where Cˆ =
∑
i∈I supλ ||gi(λ)|| because the subgradients
zi(λ) are bounded.
We further adopt the following proposition in [42]:
Proposition 6. With step size α[k] given by
α[k] > 0,
∞∑
k=0
α[k] =∞,
∞∑
k=0
α[k]2 <∞, (65)
the sequence {λ[k]} converges to an optimal dual variable
λo.
Note that ||p˜i[k] − λ[k]|| ≤ α[k]Cˆ, which means that, for
all (i, n) ∈ {(i, n) : i ∈ In}:
lim
k→∞
pi,n[k] = λ
o
n, (66)
where λo is the optimal dual variable to the dual problem in
(12). As we have discussed in Section V-A, when we substitute
λ
o
into the dual problem in (11), we also see that xi[k]→ x
o
i
for every agent i. We complete the proof.
E. Direct Decomposition and Proof of Proposition 4
In this part, we first present a direct decomposition structure
of solving the NUM Problem. We then prove the Proposition
4.
1) Direct Decomposition: We present the direct (dual) de-
composition [6] that serves as a distributed (pure) optimization
method for solving the DeNUM Problem when agents are
obedient.
To see this, we relax the constraint in (7b) and (7c) and
assign λ = {λn}n∈N to be the dual variables of it. We can
then formulate the corresponding Lagrangian of Problem in
(7), which can be further decomposed into I locally solvable
subproblems. We define the local dual function as follows:
That is, agent i’s local dual problem is:
g˜i(λ) , max
xi∈Xi
Ui(xi)−
∑
n∈Ni
λn
(
hi,n(xi)−
cn
|In|
)
. (67)
At the higher layer, we obtain the optimal dual variable λo
through solving a master (global) dual problem, given by
λo ∈ argmin
λ∈Λ
∑
i∈I
g˜i(λ), (68)
where Λ = {λ : λn ≥ 0 for each En being ≤}.
Substituting λo into (67), we will have the optimal primary
variables xoi for each agent i’s local problem. The above
approach works only if agents are obedient.
2) Proof of Proposition 4: The DyDeNUM Mechanism
together with updates in (29)-(31) performs in a similar fashion
as the incremental subgradient method does in [42]. From [42],
agents update the dual variable λ incrementally. Specifically,
λ[k + 1] = p˜I [k], (69)
where p˜i[k] ∈ R
N is the local dual variable obtained
p˜i[k + 1] (70)
=
{
p˜I [k]− α[k + 1]zi,n(p˜I [k]), if i = 1,
p˜i−1[k + 1]− α[k + 1]zi,n(p˜i−1[k + 1]), if i > 1.
The vector function zi(λ) ∈ ∂g˜i(λ) is agent i’s local subgra-
dient, given by
zi,n(λ) =
{
hi,n(di[k])−
cn
|In|
, if n ∈ Ni,
0, otherwise.
(71)
The fact that di,n = 0 if i ∈ In indicates that
p˜i,n[k + 1] (72)
=


p˜ω(i−1,n),n[k] + α[k + 1]zi,n(p˜ω(i−1,n)[k]),
if i = minj∈In j,
p˜ω(i−1,n),n[k + 1] + α[k + 1]zi,n(p˜ω(i−1,n)[k + 1]),
otherwise.
Similar to the analysis in Section B-D of this report, we can
adopt Lemma 4 and Proposition 6 to prove that di[k] → xoi
for each agent i.
F. Proof of Theorem 4
Each agent i’s long-term average utility is
lim
K→∞
1
K
[
K∑
k=1
Ui(di[k])−Πi[k]
]
= lim
k→∞
[Ui(di[k])−Πi[k]]
= lim
k→∞
Ui(di[k])−Πi[0]
+
∞∑
t=0
∑
j 6=i
∇xjUj(dj [k])
T (dj [k + 1]− dj [k]). (73)
From updates in (29)-(31), we have that, for each (i, n) ∈
{(i, n) : i ∈ In},
|pi,n[k + 1]− pi,n[k]| ≤ α[k]
[∑
i∈In
hi,n[k]
]
≤ α[0]Hn,
(74)
where Hn = maxxi∈Xi
∑
i∈In
hi,n(xi) for all n ∈ N .
Due to the compactness of Xi by Assumption 2, parameters
{Hn}n∈N always exist. On the other hand, due to the strict
concavity of the objective in (29), we have that di(pω(i−1,n))
is continuous by the maximum theorem. The continuity indi-
cates that limα[0]→0 ||di[k+1]−di[k]||2 → 0. Therefore, (73)
can be approximated as
≅ lim
k→∞
Ui(di[k])−Πi[0] +
∑
j 6=i
∫ ∞
0
∇xjUj(·)
T ddj(k)
= lim
k→∞
∑
j∈I
Uj(dj [k])−Πi[0] +
∑
j 6=i
Uj(dj [0]). (75)
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Algorithm 2: Distributive Computation of Initial Taxes
1 Initialize the iteration index k ← 0 and Πi[0];
2 Each agent j ∈ I\{i} randomly initializes
{pω˜i(j−1),n[0] = C}n∈Nj and the system designer
chooses the stopping criterion ǫ;
3 conv flag← 0 # initialize the convergence flag;
4 while conv flag = 0 do
5 Set k ← k + 1;
6 for Each sub-iteration j ∈ I\{i} do
7 Each agent j updates (dj [k], pj,n[k],∇uj [k]) by
(78)-(80);
8 The system designer updates the Πi[0] as
Πi[0] = Πi[0] +
∑
j∈I/{i}
∇uj [k]
T (dj [k − 1]− dj [k]).
(76)9
if ||pj [k]− pj [k − 1]||2 ≤ ǫ||pj [k − 1]||2 then
10 conv count← conv count + 1;
11 else
12 conv count← 0;
13 end
14 Each agent i sends pi,n[k] to agent ω˜i(i+ 1, n)
for every n ∈ Ni and conv count to agent i+1;
15 end
16 if conv count = I then
17 Set conv flag← 1 and broadcasts it;
18 end
19 end
By Proposition 4, the updates in (29)-(31) converge to the
maximal network utility, i.e.,
∑
j∈IUj(x
o
j). This means that
when all other agents are following the updates and reports
according to (29)-(31), there is no incentive for agent i to
deviate from following (29)-(31). Hence, all agents following
(29)-(31) is a Nash equilibrium.
G. Distributed Computations of Πi[0] and Proof of Proposi-
tion 5
In this subsection, we first design a distributed algorithm to
compute the initial taxes Πi[0] so that each agent’s final tax
Πi[∞] is a convergent VCG-type taxation. Then, we prove
that such a VCG-type taxation can achieve the individual
rationality.
1) Distributed Computations of Πi[0]: We define
ω˜i(n, j + 1) (77)
,
{
the (υ + 1)-th smallest index in In\{i}, if υ 6= |In| − 1,
the smallest index in In\{i}, otherwise.
Algorithm 2 shows the proposed iterative algorithm for all
agents excluding agent i to compute an appropriate Πi[0] for
each agent i, with the key steps explained as follows. Each
agent j 6= i first initializes her message mi[0] ∈ R2×|Nj |
(line 2). Note that each agent initializes her price proposal
pj,n[0] = C by the same constant in the DyDeNUM Mecha-
nism. The algorithm iteratively computes each agent’s message
and action until convergence (lines 4-18). For each iteration,
agents update their messages and actions in a Gauss-Seidel
fashion (lines 6-14). That is, we divide one iteration into I
sub-iterations (line 6). In each sub-iteration i, only agent i
updates her messages and actions, whereas the other agents
keep theirs fixed.
Specifically, in each sub-iteration j, each agent j updates
(xj [k], τ j [k],pj [k]) (in line 7) according to
dj [k] = arg max
xj∈Xj

Uj(xj)− ∑
n∈Nj
p¯ω(j−1),n[k]hj,n(xj)

 ,
(78)
pj,n[k] = (79)
p¯ω(j−1,n),n[k] + α[k]
(
hj,n(dj [k])−
cn
|In|
)
, if En is =,[
p¯ω(j−1,n),n[k] + α[k]
(
hj,n(dj [k])−
cn
|In|
)]+
, if En is ≤,
∇uj [k] = ∇xjUj(dj [k]), (80)
where α[k] is a diminishing step size, given by α[k] = (1 +
h)/(k + h) for some non-negative constant h. Note that the
updates in (78)-(80) are similar to the updates in (29)-(31).
Note that Algorithm 2 involves all agents other than i.
Hence, since each agent i does not participate in the distribu-
tive computation of her own taxation, she cannot tamper with
the algorithm to her advantage. Hence, we can assume that
each agent will follow such an algorithm.
Define xˆ
(−i) =
{
xˆ
(−i)
j
}
j∈I\{i}
as the optimal solution of
xˆ
(−i) = argmax
x−i
∑
j 6=i
Uj(xj) (81a)
s.t.
∑
j∈I\{i}
hj,n(xj) En cn, ∀n ∈ Ni, (81b)
xj ∈ Xj , ∀j 6= i, j ∈ I. (81c)
The aggregate utility
∑
j 6=i Uj(xˆ
(−i)
j ) is the maximal network
utility when agent i is absent. Similar to the argument in
Section VII-B, we can show that each agent i’s initial tax
Πi[0] can be approximated in the following manner:
Πi[0] =
∞∑
t=0
∑
j 6=i
∇xjUj(xj [k])
T (dj [k + 1]− dj [k])
≅
∑
j 6=i
∫ ∞
0
∇xjUj(·)
T ddj(k)
=
∑
j 6=i
Uj(xˆ
(−i)
j )−
∑
j 6=i
Uj(dj [0]). (82)
Due to the same initializations of the price proposals, the value
of Uj(dj [0]) is exactly the same as the value of it in (32).
2) Proof of Proposition 5: We next show that the initial
tax computed by Algorithm 2 for each agent i leads to the
individual rationality (E2).
The individual rationality of the DyDeNUM Mechanism
is an immediate result of the constructed VCG taxation.
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Specifically, each agent’s payoff at the equilibrium is given
by
Ji({m
∗[k]}k∈N) =
∑
i∈I
Ui(di[0])−
∑
j 6=i
Uj(xˆ
(−i)
j ) +
∑
i∈I
Ui(x
o
i )
−
∑
i∈I
Ui(di[0]),
=
∑
i∈I
Ui(x
o
i )−
∑
j 6=i
Uj(xˆ
(−i)
j ). (83)
As we have mentioned, due to the same initializations of the
price proposals, the terms
∑
i∈I Ui(di[0]) are cancelled out.
By the definitions of XOuti in (9) and xˆ
(−i)
in (81), we see
that the action profile x = {xi}i∈I such that
xi =
{
argmaxxi∈XOuti Ui(xi), for some k,
xˆ
(−i)
j , ∀ j 6= k,
(84)
is a feasible solution to the DeNUM Problem in (7). Hence,
by the optimality of xo, we have∑
i∈I
Ui(x
o
i ) ≥
∑
j 6=i
Uj(xˆ
(−i)
j ) + max
xi∈XOuti
Ui(xi). (85)
From (83), we have that Ji({m∗[k]}k∈N) ≥
maxxi∈XOuti Ui(xi). Hence, under Assumptions 4-5, the
DyDeNUM Mechanism achieves the individual rationality.
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